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I. COMPLIANCE RISKS OF A UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 
 
   In light of the demanding requirements inherent to the operation of a university hos-
pital, a multitude of compliance risks are entailed in the medical care, training, and re-
search entail which such institutions are engaged in. If such risks materialize, the public 
will notice, which will substantially tarnish not only the public’s confidence in the prop-
er functioning and the integrity of the impacted hospital, but ultimately, the whole 
German health care system. In examining the structural and requisite prevention proto-
cols, three risk groups can be distinguished. The Düsseldorf University Hospital pro-
vides a leading example in the area of compliance management.1 
 
To begin with, compliance risks originate out of deficiencies in both process and control 
mechanisms, which—contingent upon the remoteness of the participating personnel—
may lead to criminal liability in a negligence tort. Associated with this group of compli-
ance risks are (among others) the following situations: the inadequate observation of 
hygienic protocols2; deficiencies in the sterilization of medical equipment3; informed 
consent4 and other documentation concerns5; medical malpractice; the negligent author-
ization of access to patient records via records management software (hospital infor-
mation systems)6; and the billing of foreign doctors whose professional license ( §10 
BÄO) has expired.7 
 
The next risk group principally arises as a result of ignorance of the boundaries of crimi-
nal and/or civil law, and the corresponding social and professional rules of conduct; this 
also plays into the fact-finding phase of legal action, regarding the material facts required 			
1
 See Hendrik Schneider, Kevin Grau & Kristin Kißling, „Der Schock von Berlin saß tief!“ Ergebnisse eines 
empirischen Forschungsvorhabens zu Compliance im Gesundheitswesen und der Pharmaindustrie, CORPO-
RATE COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT  48, 48 (2013). 
2
 Case example: Birgit Hibbeler, Hygiene-Skandal in Bremen: Auf der Suche nach den Schuldigen, 108 (48) 
DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT A-2586 (2011). 
3
 Peter T. Schmidt, Klinik-Skandal: Zwei weitere Manager suspendiert, MÜNCHNER MERKUR (July 09, 
2010), available at http://www.merkur-online.de/lokales/muenchen/klink-skandal-zwei-weitere-manager-
suspendiert-835703.html (Sept. 15, 2014). 
4
 Kokularajah Paheenthararajah, Christian Hick & Axel Karenberg, Medizinprodukteberater im Opera-
tionssaal: Patientenaufklärung erforderlich, 110 (46) DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT A-2190 (2013). 
5
  Jutta Rippegather, Rhön-Klinikum in der Kritik, FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU (Nov. 14,  2009), available 
at http://www.fr-online.de/rhoen-klinikum-marburg/behandlungsfehler-rhoen-klinikum-in-der-
kritik,2641638,4431464.html (Sept. 15, 2014). 
6
  Compare Michael Schumacher: Diebe bieten Krankenakte zum Kauf an, SPIEGEL-ONLINE, (June 24, 2014), 
available at http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/leute/michael-schumacher-krankenakte-gestohlen-und-zum-
kauf-angeboten-a-976999.html (Sept.5, 2014). 
7
 Wanja Andreas Welke, Zum strafrechtlichen Risiko der Tätigkeit angestellter Mediziner ohne 
Berufsausübungserlaubnis (Approbation) an Krankenhäusern, Heft 5 GESUNDHEITSRECHT 269, 269 (2011). 
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to prove an offense or claim. 
 
This case group is a result of the increasing legal regulation of medicine8 and the devel-
opment of advancing evolution of commercial law. This development is a concise, albeit 
not sharply contoured, legal concept.9 For example, these types of risks crop up when 
professors and senior physicians work in collaboration with representatives from the 
pharmaceutical and medical instrument industries. The collaboration between medical 
staff and the various actors present in the pharmaceutical and medical instrument indus-
tries is critical to medical advancement. This is especially true in the context of university 
hospitals engaged in research projects. However, both these justifications may lead to 
conflicts of interest.10 Lucrative contracting possibilities may present professionals in the 
field with incentives to promote and use certain pharmaceutical products (for example 
consulting agreements with medical corporations which participate in medical research) 
or medical devices (for example, sponsorships provided by medical specialists’ associa-
tions, grants for continuing medical education, or corporate promotions which lend 
medical facilities medical equipment for specified projects).11 
 
In relation to this compliance concern, it must be noted that university physicians, so 
called “Key Opinion Leaders”12, are highly sought after in the medical industry. They 
play a decisive role in determining medical guidelines regarding recommended therapeu-
tic approaches in medical care. Furthermore, they contribute to leading, influential med-
ical publications, and through the lecture circuit they influence current methodologies 
and procedures in the medical field. It should be noted that raising funds from third-
parties is expected from tenured professors active in research through the university; this 			
8
  Compare Gernot Steinhilper, „Kriminogene“ Normgebung oder mangelnde Kontrolle? – Kriminalpolitische 
Überlegungen zur Eindämmung ärztliche Abrechnungsbetruges, in Kriminalpolitik und ihre wissenschaft-
lichen Grundlagen, Festschrift für Professor Dr. Hans-Dieter Schwind zum 70. Geburtstag 163 (Thomas 
Feltes et al eds., 2006); in addition Adolf Laufs, Die jüngere Entwicklung des Arztberufs im Spiegel des 
Rechts, in Das Bild des Arztes im 21. Jahrhundert 18 (Christian Katzenmeier & Klaus Bergdolt, 2009). 
9
 Hendrik Schneider, Wachstumsbremse Wirtschaftsstrafrecht, Heft 1, NEUE KRIMINALPOLITIK 30, 32, (2012); 
additionally Hendrik Schneider, Kriminalpolitische Grundlagen des Wirtschaftsstrafrechts, in 
Wirtschaftsstrafrecht 48 (Hauke Brettel & Hendrik Schneider, 1st ed. 2014).  
10
 International MARC RODWIN, CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS AND THE FUTURE OF MEDICINE: THE UNITED 
STATES, FRANCE AND JAPAN (2013); for Germany KLAUS LIEB, DAVID KLEMPERER & WOLF-DIETER 
LUDWIG, INTERESSENKONFLIKTE IN DER MEDIZIN: HINTERGRÜNDE UND LÖSUNGSMÖGLICHKEITEN, 
(2011); Klaus Lieb et al., Interessenkonflikte in der Medizin: Mit Transparenz Vertrauen stärken, 108 (6) 
DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT A-256 (2011). 
11
 Compare specifically Hendrik Schneider in Korruptionsprävention im Gesundheitswesen (Susanne Boemke 
& Hendrik Schneider, 1st ed. 2011). 
12
 This is particularly instructive insofar as all published decisions on the corruption in the field of health care 
affect all university clinic health providers; BGH; judgment from 2/25/2003, Az: V StR 363/02, NEUE 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT-RR 171, 172 (2003); BGH, judgement from 10/23/2002, Az.: I StR 541/01, 
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 763, 764 (2003); OLG Karlsruhe, decision from 3/30/2000, Az: II Ws 
181/199, STRAFVERTEIDIGER 288, 290 (2001); OLG Hamburg, decision from 1/14/2000, Az.: II Ws 243/99, 
MEDIZINRECHT 371, 373 (2000). 
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compels collaboration between researchers, and corporations in the medical industry. 
Section 25 of the German federal regulations governing universities (Ger.: 
Hochschulrahmengesetz) and their respective state regulations specifically contemplate a 
funding scheme which permits tenured professors to execute research projects which are 
financed using third-party funds as opposed to ordinary budgetary funds.13 To this end, 
North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) higher education policies call for and encourage re-
search to be sponsored by third-party funding, which are to be allocated based on merit 
(Ger: leistungsorientierte Mittelverteilung [LOM]). To fund their operating costs (Ger: 
Zuführungsbetrag) NRW gives separate grants to universities engaged in medical re-
search.14 NRW’s Department for Innovation, Science, and Research appropriates a por-
tion of this Zuführungsbetrag based on certain merit-criteria, among which are third-
party funding and publications.15 This scheme creates a situation where the type and 
amount of third-party funding becomes a factor which appeal proceedings will consider. 
 
Within the scope of applicable malpractice law (§§ 331 ff. StGB), the boundaries between 
permissible and desirable cooperation and punishable corruption are fluid and legally 
uncertain. This is also the case for the acquisition of third-party funding, which is a 
crucial source for medical practices. In fact the German Supreme Court (Ger: Bun-
desgerichtshof [BGH]) has established case law concerning this issue.16 The holdings of 
these precedential cases and their ramifications are, however, not always familiar to doc-
tors in the field. Therefore, it is difficult to rule out that tenured professors or other 
doctors employed in university hospitals may acquire third-party funding pro-
posals/projects from nonprofit organizations—which are outside the control of the 
university hospital—or other corresponding corporations. Such funding arrangements 
may lie outside the parameters outlined by the BGH for acceptable industry-funded 
research schemes. In accordance with the BGH’s decisive holding on May 23, 2002, the 
acquisition of third-party funding is legally unobjectionable only if the faculty member 
has satisfactorily observed the regulations governing universities.17 
 
With nearly 5,000 personnel and 300 trainees on staff at Düsseldorf University Hospital 
at the end of 2013, it is difficult to exclude that intentional torts may be committed by 
tortfeasors who realize the unlawful nature of such actions. The risk of genuine, inten-
tional torts presents the third type of conceivable compliance-risks university hospitals 			
13
 Compare for NRW. § 71, paragraph 1 HG NRW. 
14
 § 31b HG NRW. 
15
http://www.wissenschaft.nrw.de/hochschule/hochschulen-in-nrw/hochschulmedizin/leistungsorientierte-
mittel-lom-in-der-medizin/. 
16
 BGH, judgment from 3/23/2002 (LG Heidelberg), Az.: I StR 372/01, BGHSt 47, 295 (300); Brigitte Tag, 
Drittmitteleinwerbung – strafbare Dienstpflicht? – Überlegungen zur Novellierung des Straftatbestandes der 
Vorteilsannahme JURISTISCHE RUNDSCHAU 50, 52 (2004); Torsten Verrel, Überkriminalisierung oder Über-
treibung? MEDIZINRECHT 319, 323 (2003). 
17
 Hans Kudlich, Strafbare Erfüllung einer Dienstpflicht? Strafrechtliche Risiken bei der Einwerbung von 
Drittmitteln, FORSCHUNG & LEHRE 106, 107 (2014). 
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must contend with. This risk brings harm not only to the university hospital, but also to 
involved third-parties. Theft and embezzlement of company property, including medi-
cation and anesthesia, are the typical case configurations facing a university hospital. 
With reference to characteristic risks involving third-parties are, for instance, the under-
lying circumstances surrounding organ transplant investigation files, embezzlement of 
funds or resources appropriated by the hospital or third-parties, or fraudulent account-
ing practices to the detriment of either the national healthcare system18 or the privately-
insured patient. 
 
The underlying case configurations of organ transplant scandals evidence the presence 
of an autocratic management structure that may emerge in a university hospital. Such a 
management style may produce what could be termed a bottom-up power vacuum. Fear 
of repression or concern for their own careers may discourage lower associates from 
reporting the misconduct of leading, high-ranking hospital staff to senior management 
of the university hospital—the illusion of a class of untouchables19.20 This phenomena 
could be counteracted by whistleblower policies and protections (for example CIRS, or 
complaint management) that would provide avenues to anonymously report incidents 
to hospital senior management or compliance-authorities. 
 
These specters facing a university hospital has been diagramed below in Table 1 (“Triad 
of Compliance Risks”). 
 
Compliance Risk Attributes Explanations Example 
1. Process and 
Control defi-
ciencies 
Negligence, missing 
monitoring (for 
example, because of 
downsizing), or 
fateful coherences 
cause damages on 
legal rights 
Inconsistent ob-
servance of internal 
guidelines, deficits 
in the monitoring 
and enforcement of 
process standards 
and regulations, 
problematic out-
sourcing 
A hospital allows 
an external compa-
ny to perform the 
sterilization of 
medical equipment 
and tools. It leads 
to serious irregular-
ities and hygiene 
defects. 			
18
 Hendrik Schneider & Claudia Reich, Abrechnungsbetrug durch „Upcoding“ Ein Beitrag zu den Fallgruppen 
der „konkludenten Täuschung“ im Straftatbestand des Betruges, ONLINEZEITSCHRIFT FÜR HÖCHSTRICH-
TERLICHE RECHTSPRECHUNG ZUM STRAFRECHT 267, 268 (2012). 
19
 On the criminological background see HENDRIK SCHNEIDER & DIETER JOHN, DAS UNTERNEHMEN ALS 
OPFER VON WIRTSCHAFTSKRIMINALITÄT, EINE VIKTIMOLOGISCHE UNTERSUCHUNG; PUBLIC UND 
PRIVATE SECTOR IM VERGLEICH (1st ed., 2013). 
20
 Compare the decision of the OLG Braunschweig from 3/20/2013, Az: I Ws 49/13, RDG 2013, 288 (291) (A 
decision about the further applications of § 310, paragraph 1 Nr. 1 StPO against pretrial detention ordinance 
in Göttinger proceeding) as evidenced by the reported facts that employees responded to lower hierarchical 
levels and concerning evidence tampering relating to a Euro-transplant to message-type data to her supervisor 
and had been appeased with the commentary that they should stay relaxed, that it would eventually help 
humanly. “This is a medical ordinance which they must follow.” A further message to the clinic- or universi-
ty upper management board remained. 
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2. Ignorance of 
the boundaries 
of  criminal and 
civil law and 
their adjoining 
rules concerning 
social and pro-
fessional con-
duct, which are 
referential to 
the material 
facts required to 
prove a criminal 
offense or a civil 
infraction 
Criminality arises 
because the legal 
parameters of per-
missible medical 
and economic ac-
tivities were not 
communicated in a 
complete or under-
standable fashion 
 
 
Increasing codifica-
tion of the medical 
field, and the pro-
gressive evolution 
of white collar 
crime with core 
legal concepts and 
definitions, which 
are, though, not 
distinctly con-
toured 
University Profes-
sor Dr. X is head of 
the department for 
heart surgery of a 
university hospital. 
He receives medi-
cal-technology 
products, resources 
and services from 
companies. The 
company pays for 
certain expenses, 
like the travel costs 
for trips to profes-
sional conferences 
and for company 
and Christmas 
parties, to which 
Dr. X invited his 
department. 21 
3. Compliance 
risks of inten-
tional torts at 
the expense of 
the university 
hospital or at 
the expense of 
third parties 
Tortious actions 
are consciously and 
knowingly com-
mitted, fully aware 
of the relevant 
circumstances 
Increasing com-
mercialization of 
medicine as well as 
a bottom-up con-
trol vacuum in an 
autocratic struc-
tured management 
22 
An intentional lack 
allocations in organ 
procurement 23 
Table 1. Compliance risks in university hospitals 
II. COMPLIANCE RISKS DON’T JUST AFFECT “THOSE OTHER GUYS” 
 
   In the pursuit of compliance in university hospitals, those responsible must be pre-
pared to acknowledge that the aforementioned risks exist or can exist in any hospital or 
clinic, not just in other health-care facilities. It is well known that risk awareness and the 
mission statement established by upper management—the tone and example these set, 
and the ensuing catalysts and multiplier-effect therefrom—are critical to, and one of the 
decisive factors to the successful implementation and consequential enforcement of 
			
21
 Case before BGH, judgment from 10/23/2002, Az: StR 541/01, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 765, 
763 (2003). 
22
 Compare to Hendrik Schneider, § 4 Rdnr. 26, in Wirtschaftsstrafrecht (Hauke Brettel & Hendrik Schneider, 
1st ed. 2014). 
23
 Compare to the so-called organ-donor scandal: Hendrik Schneider & Josephine Busch, Der Lebensretter als 
Mörder? Der „Organspendeskandal“ an den Grenzen der Strafrechtsdogmatik, NEUE KRIMINALPOLITIK 
362, 363 (2013). 
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compliance tools.24 Consequently, this demands an incentive to be presented to pro-
mote compliance, and that is typically a yearly function by the enterprise’s decision-
makers. 
 
In light of this, it’s worth highlighting that the impetus to establish a Compliance-
Management-System (CMS) in the Düsseldorf University Hospital and this system’s 
sustainability is in the hands of upper management. Therefore, the importance of this 
support is clear, especially considering the complex conditions involved in the operation 
of a university hospital. This is a direct result of the cooperation-model which underlies 
the partnership between the Düsseldorf University Hospital and the Heinrich-Heine 
University. As a result this analysis requires a consideration of the differing authorities 
and contextual rights of participation held by both university and faculty leadership. In 
order to achieve substantial and coordinated results, systematic cooperation is required 
from all involved parties, and in particular from parties on the managerial level (hospital 
management, the rectorate, the faculty council, and the dean). 
 
Empirical inquiries into the implementation of compliance mechanisms in varying in-
dustries as well as the failure to appreciate the importance of such compliance apparat-
uses demonstrate that risk consciousness has not spread into the hospital industry as it 
has in other sectors.25 Evidently discussions about compliance—which are already taking 
place in other industries—must gain acceptance in the health care industry, especially in 
those organizations which operate under the assumption that they have no compliance 
risks. These organizations face an especially high risk: an organization oblivious to the 
possibility of risk creation in-house. By developing all hospital employees’ risk con-
sciousness, relevant compliance risks can be put into focus, weaknesses in prevalent in-
ternal processes can be spotted, and opportunities for intentional torts can be utilized. 
 
After recognizing substantial compliance risks and how they arise at the Düsseldorf 
University Hospital, key elements addressing those high-priority risks were developed 
and implemented in the institution’s CMS. This process is, though, still ongoing. 
 
A. Analysis of the existing compliance-instruments and identification of key 
goals in improving the Compliance Management System 
 
At the offset, it should be noted that this process at the Düsseldorf University Hospital 
has already begun. Different levels of the university hospital have already been engrossed 
in discussions about compliance and risk-prevention, which encompass the enhance-
ment in the quality of medical care, and diverse provisions by means of guidelines and 			
24
 For a political and sociological perspective, see COLIN CROUCH & CAMILLA MACLEAN, THE RESPONSIBLE 
CORPORATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2011). 
25
 Hendrik Schneider, Kevin Grau & Kristin Kißling, „Der Schock von Berlin saß tief!“ Ergebnisse eines empir-
ischen Forschungsvorhabens zu Compliance im Gesundheitswesen und der Pharmaindustrie, CORPORATE 
COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT 48, 48 (2013). 
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regulations have been advanced.26 Furthermore, the presented risks are being minimized 
through various measures, such as in-house data protection, protected health infor-
mation, managerial control over commercial and medical dimensions, sanitary measures 
and occupational safety. 
 
Goals were established for further implementation and improvements in the CMS, 
which were intended to prioritize compliance in the university hospital. These goals 
were based on an analysis of the existing compliance measures and special workshops. 
These workshops were attended by members of upper management, the authors of this 
article, members of human resources, and the administrators in the department of third-
party funding in attendance. 
 
Subsequent to this in-house evaluation of the Düsseldorf University Hospital’s CMS, 
corruption prevention became the core concern. This evaluation of the existing instru-
ments revealed that processes were already in motion on several different levels to avoid 
conflicts of interests and corruption through internal regulation and directives, touching 
upon the corresponding application forms and procedural standards (for example, “reg-
ulation of acquisitions/purchases”, “guidelines for dealings and cooperation with third-
party providers”, “the Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf’s anti-corruption guide-
lines” as well as the applications for information and approval of additional business 
employment). With the aid of individual cases and proceedings—which were part of the 
analysis—deficits in different departments, in regulations, applications, and in valida-
tion measures were able to be identified. Against this background, it is necessary to har-
monize existing regulations, to eliminate redundancies, and to hone, trim and align the 
substance of regulations to the current legal situation. 
 
Within the scope of this in-house evaluation, it was essential that the involved depart-
ments openly criticized and disputed over the up-to-now implemented compliance 
measures. In regards to the extent, structure, transparency, and tolerability of compli-
ance instruments, those particular departments occasionally have distinct issues ranging 
from lacking guidelines to non-transparent, over-reaching regulation. Prospective regu-
lations must be carved out into configurations in conformity with the law and simulta-
neously with an eye to the intended audience. It was also necessary to promote the un-
derstanding that compliance requires thinking outside of the box, and to think beyond 
work environments which are of immediacy to considerations of compliance. 
III. GOAL IMPLEMENTATION: ENHANCEMENT OF CORRUPTION-
PREVENTION 
 			
26
 On this point, compare with Abpfiff für Korruption im Gesundheitswesen, ÄRZTEZEITUNG (July 23, 2012), 
http://www.aerztezeitung.de/praxis_wirtschaft/recht/article/818480/abpfiff-korruption-
gesundheitswesen.html. 
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A. Legal Framework 
 
As explained above, corruption prevention concerns above all the cooperation of medi-
cal personnel with the medical equipment and pharmaceutical industries, and this 
touches upon areas of sponsoring (especially business trips), additional business em-
ployment, and research involving third-parties. The composition and structure of in-
house regulations outlining the requirements and limits of allowable cooperation are 
compiled in Table 2 below. 
 
 
Legal Frameworks Relevant requirements for compliance 
with AKRL control systems 
Higher Education Act of NRW § Freedom to Research and Teaching, 
§ 4 
§ Competency in the rectorate, presi-
dent and the university senate, dean-
ship, and faculty department councils 
§ Jurisdiction demarcation between the 
university hospital and the university 
in accordance with §§ 31, 31a 
§ Authorization of third-party funded 
research, § 71 
§ Regulations regarding the administra-
tion of third-party funds, § 71 
 
Regulation of University Additional 
business employment of NRW 27 
§ Differentiation between generally 
approved, notifiable additional busi-
ness work, and additional business 
work requiring authorization 
§ Requirements and boundaries of 
allowable additional business work 
§ Standards for allowing staff to exercise 
the right to engage in additional busi-
ness work 
 
Anti-Corruption Law of NRW 28 § Obligations to disclose, inform, con-
sult, inform of an offense in accord-
ance with §§ 12 or if there are indica-			
27
 Verordnung über die Nebentätigkeit des wissenschaftlichen und künstlerischen Personals an den Hochschu-
len des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen (Hochschulnebentätigkeitsverordnung-HNtV) from 12/11/1981 effec-
tive 3/09/2010. 
28
 Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Korruptionsbekämpfung und zur Errichtung und Führung eines Vergaberegis-
ters in Nordrhein-Westfalen (Korruptionsbekämpfungsgesetz-KorruptionsBG) from 12/16/2004 as amend-
ed on 12/19/2013. 
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tions that there is a corruption offense 
present 
§ Commitment to implementation of 
corruption prevention measures in ac-
cordance with § 19 
§ Implementation of the four-eyes-
principle in the execution of certain 
contracts, § 20 
§ Rotation principle, § 21 
Enactment of the Federal State Depart-
ment concerning fund allocation corrup-
tion 
§ Requirements for management re-
sponsibility (Subparagraph 2.1) 
§ Implementation of control mecha-
nisms (Subparagraph 2.2) 
§ Obligation to execute measures which 
serve to sensitize co-workers (2.4) 
§ Ancillary regulations authorizing 
additional business (Subparagraph 
2.7.2) 
§ Regulations on sponsorship (Subpar-
agraph 4) 
State Regulation on Travel Costs for 
NRW29 
§ Limits on travel costs and overnight 
reimbursements 
Rules of Professional Conduct for NRW 
Doctors30 
§ Medical autonomy in accordance with 
§ 30 
§ Appropriations prohibition in ac-
cordance with § 31 
§ Appropriations in contractual collab-
orations in accordance with § 33 
Criminal and Civil Statutes § §§ 331, etc. 31 
§ § 266 (duty of asset maintenance of 
entrusted assets of employers and as 
appropriate a third-party provider) 
 
UKVO § Delimitation of competencies in ac-
cordance with cooperation agree-
ments 
§ Regulations concerning the personnel 
of university with jobs in the universi-
ty hospital 			
29
 Landesreisekostengesetz (Landesreisekostengesetz—LRKG) from 12/16/1998, as ammended on 12/03/2013. 
30
 Berufsordnung für die nordrheinischen Ärztinnen und Ärzte from 11/14/1998, as ammended on 11/10/2012. 
31
 Concerning attendants at the university hospital, who are affected by the anti-corruptions policy, it primarily 
deals with officials as defined by §§ 11, 311 pp. StGB. 
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Codes of conduct and anti-corruption 
policy of the HHU 
§ Prohibition of acceptance of rewards 
and gifts 
§ Threat of labor law repercussions and 
other consequences 
§ Exemplary lists concerning material 
elements 
Table 2. Legal framework addressing anti-corruption guidelines 
The above-referenced legal principles illustrate the substantial restrictions placed on the 
discretionary power to develop the composition of in-house hospital regulations ad-
dressing corruption prevention. The practice of additional business work or engaging in 
third-party funded projects can be hardly be legally restricted sufficiently to where the 
staff member pursuant to either statute, an employment contract, or an ordinance has 
an expressed valid claim on the acquisition and execution of a corresponding activity. 
 
B. Objective 
 
Anticorruption policy aim to integrate clearly understandable internal rules for the in-
dividual levels of cooperation of physicians and nurses, and the university hospital with 
the medical device and pharmaceutical industries. They are supplemental to the general 
policies in place and are not specifically tailored to the specifics of the operation of a 
university hospital, in this case, the anticorruption policy of the Heinrich-Heine-
University. 
 
The focus on the requirements of the anticorruption policy is to ensure that the legal 
premises and, in particular, the limits of legal liability and culpability are accounted for, 
without always requiring an individual case-study. The developed schemes should detail 
the complex criteria of the case law to the admissibility of certain operations (external 
funding, sponsorship, etc.) to the practical level of the employees in readily understand-
able language and (without requiring employees to expend effort in researching legal 
principles) avoid legally actionable acts to be committed out of ignorance of the limits of 
the law and its subparts. Thus under a socio-legal perspective it involves both a practical 
reduction in the complexity,32 which will create a dependable basis of knowledge on 
which employees can have legal certainty of no wrongdoing. On the other hand the 
policy processes in the examination and approval of individual collaborations (compli-
ance-by-design) helps standardize and protect the administrative resources of the house 
("praise the routine"33) and decisions for or against granting authorization and to make 
these processes transparent. The parallel clarification of legal risks and of strategies for 
avoiding conflicts of interest and dependency-relationships complements those legal and 			
32
 Foundationally NIKLAS LUHMANN, VERTRAUEN: EIN MECHANISMUS DER REDUKTION SOZIALER KOM-
PLEXITÄT 100 (1st ed. 1986). 
33
 Niklas Luhmann, Lob der Routine, Band 55 VERWALTUNGSARCHIV 1, 23 (1964). 
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process-oriented perspectives to an ethical and value-based approach, which aims to 
ensure the compliance commitment34 of employees.35 
 
C. Key Points of the anticorruption policy 
 
1. The scope of application and construction of anticorruption policy 
 
In accordance with the target set out above, the scope of application of anticorruption 
policies must be extend to third-party funds. These funds are supplemental to the regu-
lar budget raised to funding of research projects. They serve to support teaching, train-
ing and improvement in the health care system; they complement those funding 
schemes in the private sector or company. Other types of grants by third-parties are to 
be considered: donations, gifts, invitations, relevant grants of drug- and medical prod-
ucts, the financing of attending continuing education events and congresses by the in-
dustry, etc.36 
 
The rules are complemented and widened by implementing regulations, which are al-
ready situated in the various existing administrative areas. These rules would be to create 
additional instruments and regulations for compliance. The content of the implement-
ed regulations are based on the organizational structure of the administration. It is 
therefore based upon the department. Implementing regulations should be created only 
if additional regulations appear as absolutely necessary—in order words, compliant 
behavior has to be practically applicable. The anticorruption policy as a guiding docu-
ment should include all the essential principle of information (for example, definitions), 
so that provisions are not redundant in the implementing regulations. This document’s 
hierarchy is divided between its labor and information processes, so that on the one 
hand the administrative assistant and the addressee on the other hand are ensured that 
can key information can be easily accessible without any important information requir-
ing a different employee to educate on the policy. In this way, policy would not be 
muddled by different administrative areas’ interpretation of, for example, the four basic 
principles of compliance. 
 
Therefore, there would ideally would be a program to educate (particularly new) em-
ployees on these policies, which would educate employees how to conduct themselves if 			
34
 Christoph E. Hauschka & Gina Greeve, Compliance in der Korruptionsprävention – was müssen, was sollen, 
was können die Unternehmen tun?, BETRIEBS-BERATER  165, 166 (2007); Martin Schulz & Hartmut Renz, 
CB-Standard: Zum Berufsbild des Compliance Officers – Entwicklung branchenübergreifender Mindestan-
forderungen, BETRIEBS-BERATER 2512, 2513 (2012). 
35
 For a perspective on the mechanisms and so-called neutralization-strategies, compare Hendrik Schneider, 
Kognitive Dissonanz als Präventionsstrategie. Überlegungen zu den Möglichkeiten der Neutralisierung
von Neutralisierungstechniken, in Kriminologie—Jugendkriminalrecht—Strafvollzug, Gedächtnissschrift für 
Michael Walter 195 (Frank Neubacher & Michael Kubik eds., 2014). 
36
 In particular, compare to the regulation materials, Hendrik Schneider in Korruptionsprävention im Gesund-
heitswesen 60 (Susanne Boemke & Hendrik Schneider, 1st ed. 2011). 
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taking part in a third-party projects, in which equipment is loaned. This education will 
ensure that employees know the rules for the acceptance and use of by third-party funds 
or equipment/medications/etc. It further ensures that such practices are not undertaken 
without the execution of a contract or without securing financing for follow-up costs. A 
contract-exemplar, which addresses the concerns of the university hospital, will address 
these concerns and are outlined in the implemented regulations. Considering the con-
text of the implemented regulations, in reality there are two essential core elements: (1) 
detailed information in thematic areas (compliance in general); and (2) communications 
about to compliance observed, process-procedures, jurisdiction, and coordination. 
 
Where necessary and possible one should reference the already implemented regulations 
and also forms contract-exemplars or to the contact person. In the current revised im-
plemented regulations provisions concerning business trips and additional business 
employment were revised and streamlined. Pamphlets on application forms will provide 
additional information and serve as an action guide, answering employees’ questions 
and facilitate processes. The implemented policies concerning external funds include, 
among other things, elaborates on the definition of third-parties, gives further instruc-
tion and guidelines on the management and use of third-materials and information 
about it. This further advises the administration on questions to be included, for exam-
ple, a note on incorporating a coordination center for clinical studies (KKS). 
 
Implemented policies on procurements (purchasing order of purchasing) represent the 
most comprehensive control, as these relate to every conceivable instance the university 
hospital may address, include the principles, workflows and regulations that govern. For 
purchasing acquisitions, the guidelines, e.g. economy and thrift, the separation-principle 
and the principle of central procurement are mandatory. In terms of product groups 
and other categories of goods, the corporate procurement officer or contact person 
should be informed of such acquisitions. In the process organization, the description to 
the applicable regulations should be outlined (for example, in award procedures, the 
procurement of investment goods, proper supplies and services), or determining 
maintenance services (information management area, medical technology and other 
technology). Essential rules for medical products (acceptance, purchasing, and mainte-
nance) can already be found in the anticorruption policy itself and in the implemented 
regulations on procurements so that guidelines for medical devices are contained in in-
house agreements. 
 
The individual administrative areas responsible for the regular updating and adjustment 
of their regulations are basically independent, and are to support legality in its participa-
tion. By assuming the changes in the implemented regulations to incorporate more in-
terested actors, it follows that this is also within the framework of working groups. It has 
been shown that the currently envisaged process of implementation of regulation of 
third-party involvement and donations required not only substantive and legal adjust-
ment, but also an analysis of process procedure and the redefinition of responsibilities 
among the actors in medical personnel, the external-division of the coordinating center 
for clinical studies, and a legal administrative body. The framework which guides chang-
es or amendments in the implemented regulations is always the anticorruption policy. 
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As a result of the anticorruption policy’s high reach because of their implemented regu-
lations a document hierarchy is created, which is illustrated in Table. 3. 
 
Anticorruption Policy 
Implemented regu-
lation 
Implemented regu-
lation 
Implemented regu-
lation 
Implemented regu-
lation 
Business 
trips/Additional 
business 
Third-party fund-
ing/donations 
Acquisitions Medical products 
Table 3. Structure of the anticorruption policy 
According to a clarifying preamble, further clarification is needed of the appellative 
function and the establishment of the personal and material scope which clarifies the 
policy to be designated as classic basic principles of anti-corruption. These are highlight-
ed in all industry codes. 
 
2. Basic principles of anticorruption; their ascertainment in the AKRL and their 
implemented regulations 
 
Three basic principles of an anticorruption policy can be delineated: (1) the transparency 
principle, requiring the disclosure of all grants obtained by the commercial director of 
the university hospital; (2) the documentation principle, which requires documentation 
of all dealings and agreements, in particular by unilateral grants (for example, sponsor-
ships); and (3) the authorization principle,37 which requires all bilateral agreements to be 
contractually authorized. The authorization with full knowledge of the relevant con-
tractual provisions involves authorization on part of the top members of management, 
which falls within the meaning of § 331 Abs. 3 StGB. However the scope and meaning as 
found in the dogmatic §§ 331 ff. StGB has not yet clarified the matter conclusively. The 
relevant decisions of the BGH have shown that the presence of authorization is evidence 
			
37
 The question of who is responsible for the granting of authorization within the meaning of § 331, paragraph 3 
of the Criminal Code is disputed and not yet clarified last authentic by a Supreme Court decision. The law 
speaks of "the competent authority". Thus, the assumption is derived in criminal literature. In all cases in 
which no authorities structure are present due to the organizational structure of the house, the respective 
heads of the legal department is responsible (Siegfried Jutzi, Genehmigung der Vorteilsannahme bei nicht in 
einem öffentlich-rechtlichen Amtsverhältnis stehenden Amtsträgern, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT 
105, 106 (1991). The opposite conception (Albus, the cooperation between industry and physicians at medical 
university school directions. Under the suspicion of beneficial adoption and corruption according to §§ 331, 
332 of the Criminal Code, 1st edition, pp 104) according to which jurisdiction in this important practical cases 
(about transfers to an account opened and monitored by the hospital externally-account) is to go for example 
at university hospitals in the respective federal standing, is a hardly viable and dogmatic unconvincing; in par-
ticular, compare Hendrik Schneider, Die Dienstherrengenehmigung des § 331 Abs. 3 StGB. Bedeutung und 
Reichweite am Beispiel der Kooperation zwischen Ärzten und der Arzneimittel- bzw. Medizinprodukteindus-
trie, in Festschrift für Hans-Heiner Kühne zum 70. Geburtstag 477 (Esser et al. eds., 2013). 
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against the presence of an illicit agreement.38 Apart from that, the transparency and 
authorization principle also stem from relevant public-regulations and collective agree-
ment provisions. 
 
In addition—without dispensing with the medical expertise which professors and doc-
tors provide—the separation principle must be considered. In addition to the relevant 
provisions in the anticorruption policy this principle is supported by organizations in 
the procurement processes and a separate procurement regulatory bill. The procure-
ment regulatory requires truthfulness on part of the employee. Incorruptibility, loyalty 
to one's own company, and fairness to suppliers guide the values in compliance culture. 
 
The procurement of equipment and durable goods requires proper services and 
maintenance services on behalf of the board of management; these are the sole responsi-
bility of the central procurement offices. In essence, it is the four-eyes-principle. Orders 
and performance requirements executed by unauthorized employees are considered not 
legally enforceable. Medical, qualitative, and economic aspects are harmonized through 
a continued constructive exchange of experiences of the central shopping as well as those 
employees involved in purchasing. In accordance with the complementary actions of the 
risk-management office in procurement decisions it is further provided that at least 
three offers must be solicited, in some cases five. The end results of this decision-making 
processes must be documented in writing on specified forms. The existence of conflicts 
of interest is determined on an ad hoc basis, for example, by request of the Human Re-
sources Department (e.g. with respect to additional business employment, consultation 
agreements with certain providers). 
 
The equivalence principle, which is developed the allowance and upper limits of pay, is 
embodied in other provisions of the anticorruption policy. This ensures an appropriate 
balance between the services of doctors and refunds/inducements on the part of indus-
try. Note that it is the concept of appropriateness legal status may be a so-called en-
hancement concept, which opens up a certain economic playroom by the investigating 
authorities. Against this background, there is not an appropriate remuneration, but a 
corridor of reasonable lower limits, which are marked out by the already adequate and 
the upper limit of equitable remuneration.39 			
38
 Paradigmatically, BGH, judgment from 2/25/2003, Az. V StR 363/02, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
STRAFRECHT -RR 173, 171 (2003); “With the penal regulations of § 331 of the Criminal Code - intensified by 
the anti-corruption law – it is also the cause of an appearance of possible ‘venality’, which is encountered by 
officials. The sensibility of the legal community, when considering the culpability of the counter measure of 
benefits by officials, is also present in cases of this kind, and have now been sharpened considerably. Thus, in 
such cases with future officials, the adoption of any advantages that can be brought in connection with their 
official exercise will be demanded with strict hedging of transparency in respect to openness and solicitations 
on permits in regards to the legality of the university”; in the academic literature, compare Daniel Geiger, An-
tikorruption im Gesundheitswesen, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT 5, 1 (2011); see also the com-
ments to the FS drug industry to service men's approval (May 2010). Available online at www.fsa-pharma.de 
39
 See Hendrik Schneider & Thorsten Ebermann, Das Strafrecht im Dienste gesundheitsökonomischer Steuer-
ungsinteressen, ONLINEZEITSCHRIFT FÜR HÖCHSTRICHTERLICHE RECHTSPRECHUNG ZUM STRAFRECHT 	
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3. Regulations on the individual levels of cooperation with the industry 
 
In the above sections, it was shown that the anticorruption policy regulates the details of 
the cooperation of the medical professional personnel of the Düsseldorf University 
Hospital with the pharmaceutical and medical devices industry. Regulations have clari-
fied the research with third-party funding the administrative sovereignty is to be vested 
in the financial department. Third-party contracts are to be translated into English or 
another foreign language when necessary. It is the written-form requirement. It also 
deals with the permissible purposes of the use of third-party funds, the corresponding 
personnel measures and the possible uses in case of surplus external funds that are al-
lowed to remain in accordance with the underlying contract at the university hospital. 
In the implemented regulations of third-party dealings, it is prohibited the adoption of 
any kind of remuneration contained in third-party funds. Corresponding research pro-
jects are exclusively to be unwound through the university hospital. For each third-
party-plan a separate accounting book are set up. It is also ensured that a project manag-
er can, at any time, conduct an online account-query. 
 
Principle schemes also exist to set regulations addressing the acceptance of donations 
and for dealing appropriately with grants of the medical devices industry, the acceptance 
of gifts and invitations (including the setting of an unobjectionable value limits). 
Through the relevant regulations, those additional public and legal regulations (includ-
ing collective bargaining arrangements) are enhanced and refined. 
 
Another focus is on arrangements for the participation of so-called external (that is una-
ligned from UKD) and internal (that is, aligned by the workers of UKD) congresses and 
continuing education events—that is, as far as these are funded by the industry, or at 
least supported by their sponsorship. In this respect, a distinction must be made be-
tween active and passive participation. The anticorruption policy contains upper limits 
for legally acceptable, adequate sponsorship and standards for transparent contract de-
sign (including such areas as travel expenses/entertainment expenses/overnight stays 
/remuneration), which aim for a good balance of performance and reward. This would 
include, for example, renting exhibition booths. 
 
IV. SUMMARY OF THE ESSENTIAL STEPS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IN UKD 
 
  The essential steps for the implementation of the CMS can be summarized in Illustra-
tion 1 below. 			
219, 221 (2013); Daniel Geiger, Das Angemessenheitspostulat bei der Vergütung ärztlicher Kooperationspartner 
durch die Industrie, ARZNEIMITTEL UND RECHT  99, 101 (2013). 
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Compliance-Aim 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 1. Steps in implementing the CMS 
V. COMPLIANCE ORGANIZATIONS  
 
  The Düsseldorf University Hospital has deliberately refrained from creating an inde-
pendent agency to exclusively engage in compliance functions. At the university hospi-
Impulse and Mission Statement of the 
University Hospital Management 
Survey 
Determining the 
legal parameters; 
discretionary and 
compositional 
scopes 
Simplify administrative 
processes 
Minimize risks for the 
corporation and its 
employees 
Affect long-term cor-
porate-culture 
Implementation 
How to organize it? How to establish it? How to regulate it? 
Through standardized 
procedures 
Through precise (le-
gal) rules of conduct 
Through definitions as 
well as communication 
of leading results for 
compliance-culture 
How to monitor it? 
Through revisions and 
sustainability protection 
Compliance System 
Risk Analysis 
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tal, compliance is in the form of three-lines-of-defense model (see illustration 2). This 
means that after the operational management of compliance in the medical, nursing and 
administrative areas, the staff functions stand as the second line of defense. In particular 
are the controlling, the administrative body right and quality control (medical-
organizational). The third line is the function of internal audit, which measures risk 
management and evaluates their results. 
 
Empirically, compliance violations are known by various representatives of the three 
lines. An exchange between second and third line defenses is implemented to evaluate 
incidents and to consider specifics and draw conclusions therefrom. Reporting lines 
exist for incorporating experiences, and to initiate response from the public relations 
officers. 
 
  
 
   
    
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
   
Illustration 2. The Three-lines-of-Defense at the Düsseldorf University Hospital 
(Graphic by Thomas Breitfeld, Head of Internal Audit, Mechthild Lambers and Prof. Dr. Hen-
drik Schneider) 
Three Lines of Defense 
Risk Consideration 
Position 
Task 
Before the event Before the event/ after the event After the event 
First line Second line Third line 
Risk taker Risk control (staff functions) 
Risk protection 
(internal revision) 
Risk prevention, 
awareness, and 
handling of risk 
takers (operative 
management) 
1. In advance, 
testing, audit-
ing, and con-
sulting; 
2. Composition; 
3. Sensitizing 
 
= Measures of 
Risk 
Assessment of the 
measures for risk 
control and the 
ensuing results 
Register and 
prevent 
Detect and re-
spond 
Evaluate and 
communicate Disclosure of risk: 
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VI. LOOKING FORWARD 
 
  In the future, the Düsseldorf University Hospital will essentially faces the following 
challenges and questions: 
 
It could be asked whether a centralization of compliance would result in higher levels of 
productivity as a byproduct of the second line of defense. Currently, a model is in place 
which already involves actors in compliance regulation through a office of compliance. 
A separate compliance organization could be created to address jurisdictional issues and 
questions concerning (policy-) skills. 
 
The creation of a compliance board has not yet been conclusively approved. A compli-
ance board shouldn’t only regulate particular cases on an ad hoc basis based on referrals 
from affected areas, but to serve as a middleman between the individual areas of the 
university hospital (shopping, finance, personnel, etc.) to allow a rule-based exchange 
about compliance issues. This exchange should aim at identifying the fundamental is-
sues in compliance in the organization and then developing solutions. Moreover, it 
would be designed so to have at least one board member who would have an obligation 
to report to the executive board. 
 
Overall, compliance should not lead into compliance overkill. Like the adage of the me-
dieval pharmacist: it is the dosage that makes the poison. 
